SHIELD/ATLAS — Evaluator Showcase (DITS Counter-UAS

EVALUATOR-FACING CAPABILITY PROOF · LIVE PRODUCTION

Train as we fight. Open architecture. Real receipts.

This page exists for two evaluation panels: the AFRL / Doolittle Counter-UAS Tech Showcase (DITS) and the DIU / CENTCOM EXTiC 26-2 Open Call for Technology. Every claim below resolves to a live module on this same production deployment. No slides. No mocks.

SDVOSB CAGE 9VKK3 SAM.gov VERIFIED U.S.-Based · Austin TX U.S.-Citizen Workforce No Foreign Ownership CMMC 2.0 L2 (controls implemented)

PURSUIT 1

AFRL / Doolittle Counter-UAS Tech Showcase

F2T2EA workflow vs Group 1 UAS · cluttered & contested · MOSA · static & mobile

Submission: EOI form + 1-page Distro-A capability summary → techtransfer@doolittleinstitute.org

Deadline: 22 Apr 2026 · 1700 CST

PURSUIT 2

DIU / CENTCOM EXTiC 26-2

Vertical 4 (Integrated C2 & Defeat Layer) primary · Vertical 5 (Resilience & Sustainment) integrated · native Vertical 1/2 ingest

Submission: 10-pg whitepaper + 1-pg quad chart → EXTiC 26-2 Intake Form

Deadline: 5 May 2026 · 1200 MDT

1 F2T2EA — full kill chain in production

DITS asks for Find · Fix · Track · Target · Engage. The platform implements all five as an explicit state machine with human-on-the-loop authorization at every release gate. EXTiC's Vertical 4 mission thread is the same chain extended with assess/re-engage. The animation below cycles automatically; every phase links to the live module that performs it.

Find

Multi-source ingest: CoT, STANAG-4586/4676, ADS-B, AIS, RF, EO/IR, partner sensors

Fix

Fusion engine correlates & deduplicates contacts; MIL-STD-2525D symbology

Track

Persistent custody across heterogeneous sensors; STANAG-4676 ISR exchange

Target

Weapon/fuze auto-recommend; kinetic + non-kinetic deconfliction

Engage

Human-on-the-loop authorize · effector cue · BDA · re-engage loop · audit chain

Common Operating Picture

/cop · /dod-cop

Live COP with AIS, ADS-B, METOC, terrain, MIL-STD-2525D symbology, force tracking.

Kill-Chain State Machine

/kill-chain-simulation · /kill-web

Six-phase state machine, weapon/fuze recommendation, deconfliction, audit-logged transitions.

UAS Threat Intelligence

/drone-intel · /uas-intel

Persistent threat library, hardware-fingerprint matching for sUAS classification.

2 DDIL operations & Alt/PNT resilience

Both panels care about this. DITS calls it "cluttered, complex, contested." EXTiC calls it Vertical 5 "Resilience & Sustainment." It's the same problem — keep operating when the link drops and GPS lies. Built into the architecture, not bolted on.

GPS-Denied Navigation

/gps-denied · /nav

Nine real adversary jammer profiles modeled (R-330Zh, Pole-21, Krasukha-4, others). Backup PNT: eLoran, LEO-PNT, INS, TERCOM, VIO, celestial fix (Saint-Hilaire intercept).

7-Gate Tactical Onboarding

/onboarding · /unit-demo

Auto-detects LTE / MESH / SAT / fully-DDIL on session start; selects transport; resumable from checkpoint when conditions change.

Unit Onboarding & Interop

/unit-demo · /interop-demo

Live walkthrough: a unit comes online, and the multi-unit COP picture forms with scoped collaboration grants.

3 DITS criteria — line by line

Doolittle's submission page lists explicit criteria for candidate technologies. Here's how SHIELD/ATLAS maps, with the live receipt for each.

DITS criterion	SHIELD/ATLAS	Live receipt
F2T2EA workflow against Group 1 UAS	✓ Full Find–Fix–Track–Target–Engage as an explicit six-phase state machine with human-on-the-loop authorization.	/kill-chain-simulation
Cluttered, complex, contested	✓ Native DDIL operations; offline-first sync; mesh-aware transport; nine-jammer Alt/PNT resilience model.	/gps-denied
User-maintainable, modular, reconfigurable, updatable	✓ Browser-delivered; configuration-driven onboarding; continuous deployment; no per-operator install.	/onboarding
MOSA / Open Systems Architecture	✓ MIL-STD-2525D, CoT, STANAG-4586/5516/4676, REST/JSON, WebSocket, SSE — all open standards, no proprietary formats required.	/cop
Static and mobile scenarios	✓ Same browser delivery serves fixed-site, vehicle-mounted, and operator-portable use cases without redeployment.	/mobile-hub
Target-agnostic	✓ Threat library and kill-chain logic are not tied to a specific sUAS class — fiber-tethered, FPV, swarm, conventional Group 1 all addressable.	/drone-intel
Software / Sensors / Effectors / Integrated Systems	✓ Software + Integrated Systems. Native ingest from third-party Sensors and Effectors via standard interfaces — we are the connective tissue, not a competitor.	/joint-ops

4 EXTiC 26-2 verticals — alignment

EXTiC asks technologies to align to one or more of five verticals. SHIELD/ATLAS occupies Vertical 4 (primary) and Vertical 5 (integrated), and natively consumes outputs from Vertical 1 and Vertical 2 partner vendors.

V	EXTiC vertical	Posture	SHIELD/ATLAS contribution
1	Detection & Early Warning	Supporting	Native CoT / STANAG ingest from partner sensor vendors; we are the C2 layer their hardware plugs into.
2	ISR & Target Custody	Strong supporting	Persistent track custody; STANAG-4676 exchange; substantive Alt/PNT story for UAS continuity under EW.
3	Adversarial EW & Swarm Emulation	Not addressed	Blue-side platform; we operate against Red-force pressure rather than emulate it.
4	Integrated C2 & Defeat Layer	PRIMARY	Open-arch C2, fused COP, automated cueing, kinetic + non-kinetic deconfliction, sensor-to-shooter end-to-end.
5	Resilience & Sustainment	INTEGRATED	DDIL operations, Alt/PNT resilience, mesh-aware transport, autonomous fallback within delegated authority.

5 Verifiable trust & accountability

A C2 system that cannot prove what it did and why is not deployable in a peer-evaluated, contested environment. Four mechanisms address this.

Hash-Chain Audit Log

FedRAMP AU-11 control family

Every unit creation, permission grant, kill-chain transition, weapon recommendation, and authorization is appended to a tamper-evident chain.

MAP-GAP Continuous Governance

ai-audit-engine.ts · symmetry-enforcer.ts

AI auditor (Anthropic Claude) cross-checks every claimed capability against the actual codebase on a continuous cycle. Multi-provider consensus lanes (GPT, Gemini, Sonar) are architected but currently off per program directive 2026-04-23.

RBAC + Collaboration Grants

unit-hierarchy.ts · platform.ts

RBAC at unit-hierarchy and data-type level. Cross-unit sharing requires explicit, time-bounded, scope-bounded grant — audit-logged.

CMMC 2.0 Level 2 Controls

controls implemented to standard

MFA, JWT session integrity, structural CUI spillover prevention, single-classification posture, encrypted-at-rest persistence.

6 Eligibility attestation

Both DITS and EXTiC require explicit eligibility statements. Stated plainly:

U.S.-Based

Yes

Austin, Texas

U.S.-Citizen Workforce

Yes

100% U.S.-citizen team

Foreign Ownership / Control

None

No significant OCONUS interests or obligations

SAM.gov

Verified

Active registration

SDVOSB

Certified

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business

CAGE Code

9VKK3

Integrated Services and Solutions LLC

Existing DoD/DHS contracts

None

Active acquisition pursuits only — no current contractual obligations

OCI (EXTiC)

Demonstrator only

Will not perform assessment, evaluation, scoring, or advisory functions

7 Independent validation — network-dependent autonomy receipts

SHIELD/ATLAS is built around the premise that autonomous systems must continue functioning when the network degrades — DDIL operations, Alt/PNT resilience, and offline-first sync are not bolted on, they are the architecture. The receipts below are independent, public-source validations of the underlying problem. They are cited here from the original public sources, not from any social-media commentary, and they describe events caused by network failure with no adversary action involved.

U.S. Navy 2025 Safety Report — multi-vehicle USV Starlink degradation

Source: U.S. Navy 2025 unmanned-surface-vessel safety report (public)

The Navy's 2025 safety report on unmanned surface vessel operations documented multi-vehicle degradation events traced to Starlink connectivity loss. Findings explicitly identify network-dependent autonomy as a recurring failure mode for fleet-scale USV operations, independent of any adversary EW action.

April 2025 California USV test — multi-vehicle Starlink degradation

Source: U.S. Navy 2025 USV safety report (public)

During an April 2025 multi-vessel USV test off California, simultaneous degradation of multiple unmanned vessels was tied to Starlink link instability. The event is documented in the same Navy safety report and is a clean blue-on-blue case — no adversary jammer present, no contested spectrum, and the autonomy still failed because the link did.

August 2025 global Starlink outage — ~24 USVs offline ~1 hour

Source: Reuters coverage of the Aug 2025 Starlink global outage (public)

A roughly hour-long global Starlink service outage in August 2025 took an estimated ~24 unmanned surface vessels offline simultaneously, with no adversary action involved. The event was covered by Reuters and other mainstream outlets and is a real-world demonstration that single-vendor satcom dependency creates correlated failure across an entire unmanned fleet.

SHIELD/ATLAS's response to this class of failure is structural: native DDIL operations, mesh-aware transport, autonomous fallback within delegated authority, and the nine-jammer Alt/PNT model documented in /gps-denied. The platform is designed so that when the link drops — for any reason, adversary or otherwise — the operator and the autonomy keep working.

BRIEF CHEATSHEET

TF DAGGER · ONE FIGHT · 9 STEPS

UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Greg Funk Teams brief · 29 APR 2026 1000 EDT · ISS LLC / Dr. Terry Flood / CAGE 9VKK3

OPENING (30 sec)

"One fight, one screen. TF DAGGER, hostile UAS swarm bearing 270, 22km. PTDS-1 has it. ALPHA-1 through 8 are airborne, BRAVO-6 is C-RAM, CHARLIE-1 is on shore, LOG-1 is the tail. I'm going to walk you the kill chain end to end — sensor to shooter to BDA — in nine steps."

THE 9 STEPS · CLICK EACH

1. DETECT — Swarm C2

"PTDS-1 picks up 4 hostile UAS. ALPHA-1..8 receive cue at H+0."

2. CLASSIFY — CRAM Dashboard

"BRAVO-6 confirms hostile UAS, declares THREATCON RED at H+1."

3. FUSE — DoD Common Op Picture

"All four domains on one screen. Land/air/sea/cyber. No swivel-chair."

4. EXTEND — Maritime Domain

"CHARLIE-1 sees the surface threat. AIS + radar + visual cross-cue."

5. PRIORITIZE — Commander Dashboard

"Critical/High/Med/Low live counts. Commander sees the queue."

6. ASSESS — DIME-PMESII

"Operational Environment overlay. Diplomatic / Info / Mil / Econ options."

7. LOCATE — Peer Geolocation

"GPS-denied. Multi-node TDOA. Covariance ellipse on the map."

8. DECIDE — Intel Fusion

"AI never authors lethal numbers. Human-in-loop for every kinetic call."

9. ACT + BDA — Brief Runbook (full script)

"LOG-1 closes the loop. BDA back to PTDS-1. One fight, one screen."

SLIDE QUICK-JUMP · DEFENSE BRIEFING DECK

Echelon Break — Strategic / Op / Tactical / Edge

Navy / USMC — EABO, Stand-In Force, POSEIDON

Army — ADOC complement, BCT-down, ATAK

Air Force — ABMS, ACE, AOC-edge node

Space Force — SDA, LEO-PNT, Spectrum/EW

Firestorm Labs — xCell + Tempest + Swarm C2

Link 16 / J-Series / COMSEC posture (plain English)

This Week · What's Done / In Flight / On Deck

Single source of truth post-Greg-Funk brief. POC targets (Jaded Thunder Visceral, Booz Allen, EUD) tracked here, not as sales slides.

IF ASKED: LINK 16 / COMSEC — PLAIN ENGLISH

If you only remember one line:
"We don’t transmit on Link 16, and we don’t hold the secret keys. We read a translated unclassified copy that the unit’s government-owned translator box hands us."

If pressed for more:
• Link 16 is the military’s classified group-chat for jets, ships, ground — you need an encrypted radio (MIDS) and the day’s secret keys to talk on it. We have neither. We don’t need either.
• The unit’s person who safeguards those keys (the COMSEC custodian) keeps that job. We change nothing about their security setup.
• The unit also has a government-owned translator box that copies Link 16 messages to the unclassified side. We read from that box. We never write back into the secret side.
• What we add: we mix those tracks with our 9,500+ aircraft and 12,000+ ship feeds onto one map and give the commander a clean picture with a decision queue.
• If the translator goes dark we keep running on commercial feeds and clearly label the Link 16 picture as stale. No silent failures.

Why it matters to them: "Days to stand up, not 18 months. No new accreditation. No new keys. No new custodian. Their security chain is unchanged."

HARD RULES — SAY THESE

• "No FedRAMP, no IL-5, no CAC, no SIPRNET, no FIPS, no ATO — this is unclas commercial."
• "AI never authors ballistic numbers. Lethal calls are human-in-loop."
• "468 docs in the RAG corpus. No live web fetch."
• "SDVOSB-pending, CAGE 9VKK3."

CLOSING (15 sec)

"That's the kill chain. One screen, nine steps, every domain. Lattice gives you a map; we give you the fight. Cost? A fraction of a prime program. Standards? Open. Schedule? Today. Let me know what you want to drill into."

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SHIELD/ATLAS — EVALUATOR SHOWCASE